



Paper No. 6

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OFFICE OF PETITIONS

In re Application of
Costa, et al.
Application No. 09/961,104
Filed: September 24, 2001
Attorney Docket No. 114303.3060
For: ALARM PULL-STATION WITH CAMERA

ON PETITION

This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a), and in the alternative, under 37 CFR 1.137(b), to revive the above-identified application. Both petitions were filed in the same paper on July 2, 2003.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) is **DISMISSED**.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) is **GRANTED**.

This application was filed on September 24, 2001. On October 23, 2001, the Office mailed a Notice to File Corrected Application Papers, setting forth a 2 month extendable period to submit substitute drawings in compliance with 37 CFR 1.84. The Office did not receive a reply. Thus, this application became technically abandoned on November 25, 2001. The filing of the instant petition precedes the mailing of a Notice of Abandonment.

A grantable petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply, unless previously filed; (2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(l); (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) was unavoidable; and (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(c). The instant petition lacks item (3).

Regarding (3), petitioner has not shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay from the due date of the reply to the filing of a grantable petition was unavoidable.

Decisions on reviving abandoned applications on the basis of "unavoidable" delay have adopted the reasonably prudent person standard in determining if the delay was unavoidable:

The word 'unavoidable' . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men

in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present.

In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912)(quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913). In addition, decisions on revival are made on a "case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account." Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 USPQ 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Finally, a petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable." Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316-17, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1131-32 (N.D. Ind. 1987).

Petitioners allege that the delay in responding to the October 23, 2001 Notice was unavoidable because the attorney of record was in the process of relocating offices and was no longer located at the mailing address of the October 23, 2001 mailing.

Applicants have not shown that adequate provisions were made for the careful handling of Office correspondence in order to ensure a timely response. Applicants are responsible for apprising the Office of changes in correspondence address. Delay in prosecution resulting from the lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice or the MPEP is not unavoidable. See Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 317, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1132 (N.D. Ind. 1987), Vincent v. Mossinghoff, 230 USPQ 621, 624 (D.D.C. 1985); Smith v. Diamond, 209 USPQ 1091 (D.D.C. 1981); Potter v. Dann, 201 USPQ 574 (D.D.C. 1978); Ex parte Murray, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 130, 131 (1891). A delay caused by the failure on the part of the petitioner to provide the Office with a current correspondence address does not constitute an unavoidable delay. See Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 34 USPQ2d 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1995).


The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) is dismissed. Pursuant to petitioners' authorization, deposit account no. 50-2036 will be charged the \$110 fee associated with filing a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a).

In the alternative, petitioners request consideration under 37 CFR 1.137(b). Applicants have submitted a reply in the form of substitute drawings, an acceptable statement of the unintentional nature of the delay in responding to the October 23, 2001 Notice, and authorization to charge the petition fee. Pursuant to petitioners' authorization, deposit account no. 50-2036 will be charged the \$1,300 fee associated with filing a petition to revive.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) is **GRANTED**.

After the mailing of this decision the application will be forwarded to the Office of Initial Patent Examination for further processing.

Telephone inquiries concerning this matter may be directed to the undersigned at (703) 308-6712.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "E. Shirene Willis".

E. Shirene Willis
Senior Petitions Attorney
Office of Petitions